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Momodou
Denmark
11717 Posts |
 Posted - 03 Oct 2010 : 17:42:50
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This is an interesting review of the former President D.K Jawara’s Autobiography. Courtisy of Senegambianews.
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D.K Jawara’s Autobiography: Protectorate Fallout, Leadership Lapses
By Kemo Kinteh, Zurich, Switzerland
Published 09/05/2010
“in my lonely struggle to keep the trolley straight along the long corridors of the sprawling airport,” Jawara continues, “life was teaching me that there would be times when there would be luggage trolleys to push on my own” - perhaps the most humbled descriptions of the former president coming to terms with his demise as a statesman. An attribute he so long enjoyed but lost.
Dear readers,
Before I get into the details of this review, I would like to inform you how I want to organize this review and the grand themes which I will examine. I will structure the review under these grand themes, namely:
1. Childhood and Education
2. Jawara and PPP formation
3. Universal adult suffrage in Gambia
4. Tensions after 1975
5. The protectorate fallout
6. 1981 coup and vulnerability of the leadership
7. Missed chance of 1992 PPP congress in Mansakonko
8. Leadership vacuum waiting occupation
9. The inconclusive reconciliation.
Childhood and education
As a Mandinka child who went out early from home to study, I was moved by Jawara’s childhood stories, and I can totally identify with them. Though my case happened in 1989 when the protectorate had almost caught up with the urban areas in terms of school facilities, in 1932 substantial margin of difference existed. And in my case, I accompanied my own uncle who was a headmaster compared with Jawara who had to not only change vicinity but also go into a different culture and language groups. Added to these constraints is that while my father was happy and encouraging sending us all to English school, none of Jawara’s Kabilo was pleased with that idea of Pa Yoma in 1932. It was very significant event and constraints which will not only shape Jawaras personal life but also his leadership ups and downs. I did my primaries 3 to 5 in Kerr Ardor, and six in Farafenni both in North Bank Division. Although that’s not that far from my village, after only a year in Kerr Ardor, I witnessed perception changes in me compared to my own village friends who remained home and visited the village school. In a nutshell, I shared classes at the age of 8 years with Wollofs, Serrers , Bambaras and Fulas. This experience shaped me till today and influences all my decisions and interaction with other Gambians and other colors as well.
It’s in the same light but with a different environment and time that I understand Jawara when he talks thankfully of Pa Yoma who was a Fula and Pa Sallah (the headmaster who kept him in school) who was also a wollof/fula. The opportunity and care given to him at PA Yoma’s house was exemplary and which no small youngster will forget. The selflessness of Pa Salla to recall Jawara by force (almost) from Barajally to continue his school was gigantic gestures which our country needed and need today. They are gestures beyond regional and ethnic mentalities, gestures that help in small but significant ways to foster national consciousness among our eight ethnic groups.
The Methodist school was a Christian high school. Its curriculum and ritual promotes and encourages western and Christian values into pupils. This is unfortunate case in the colonial time because it made many Muslim and protectorate pupils feel inferior to the ideals of the western and Christian lifestyle. A teenager like Jawara at the time wanting to succeed had to have a big resolve to withstand the temptations of a westernized lifestyle. Even I admired the neatly dressed school boys and girl from the Aku and upper class Wollof homes and had my frustrations with a sometimes restrictive and traditional Mandinko homes. That was my school years, between 1993-1998 in Banjul, thus another environment altogether compared to Jawara’s stay at Methodist Boys and Bathurst in the 1930s. I and many pupils’ advantage was that Jawara and the others pioneered the struggle to extend education to all children irrespective of where they lived and which religion they believed in.
Jawara made no judgment on the subject of his unsmooth early education in Bathurst in his book. He just narrates the events and his feelings, and blames neither himself nor anybody for the wrongs or the rights, but also inconclusive. He changes his names in this early age to adapt himself to the realities of the time and to succeed. Can we blame the colonial policies for undermining relations by setting up Muslim pupils against their own communities? I mean by indoctrinating them. Can we blame the Muslim mainstream for not standing by their children mentally and psychologically as they go through the education system in place? Of course an elder from the protectorate will tell you but we have our Arabic school where we send our kids and it is only those who want to be with the white colonizers who send their kids to colonial schools. Are they right today in retrospective? Although not stated categorically, between the lines though, relations between Jawara and his father Almamy were strained because Almamy was not happy with the path Jawara was taking either, because of his status within the community or his conscience. I can’t imagine how it would have been for me if my father was against my education. And father and son relation to get strained at such early is an immense constraint and handicap for a young person growing up. I would blame D.K for certain steps in his life in regards to his family but not in this section. I think and believe him when he says “he was a victim of the place and time”. Or we can say that Jawara embodies the victims of the proxy wars the traditional rural Mandinkas were fighting against the Bathurst colonialist and indigenous urban upper class.
Jawara and the formation of PPP
“People bring me a message” and “in the throes of politics”, as Jawara himself titled it must have been exciting times indeed. A start without certainty I can imagine. This was based on few observations I made as I read the book.
First, who were those who brought the message and what did they want? Secondly, was Jawara ready to lead? Thirdly, what was his connections to the protectorate people apart from being linguistically alike them? Finally to what extent must Jawara compromise his personal ideals to the ideals of the PPP movement whose leaders and base wanted to do nothing with the Bathurst except to snatch away political power? Jawara was supposed to act as the go between types of PPP secretary, while the uneducated party leaders define the path. They brought him the message because they were looking for educated off springs of the protectorate that can read the writings and speak the language of the colonialist. That made Jawara different from independent freedom activist like Senghor of Senegal, who actually set up their own parties, and thus defined the path from onset. Jawara would do it later when he rebuffed and ousted Sanjally Bojang, who in 1958, wanted to destroy the PPP with the help of the UP. Bojang’s “PPP teh ta” announcement in Bathurst perhaps pulled Jawara from the shadows for the first time in the man’s life into taking his destiny into his own hand. But Sanjally failed, not because of Jawara’s courage, but involvement of the Banjul Wollof elites in Sanjally’s coup against the PPP, which prompted the Mandinka group to rally extra more behind Jawara. This episode was and remained a crucial moment until the 1975 when Jawara himself will draw prominent UP members like Momodou Musa Njie and Burang John into the PPP, and thus weaken the UP forever. However, this time, Jawara also alienated himself slowly, but seemingly, from his Mandinka protectorate base, culminating into the 1981 coup d’état.
Jawara’s personal lifestyle at the time of PPP formation was a big contrast to the life of the PPP base and illiterate leaders. He was already a Christian, married an Aku woman without the blessing of his Barajally families. He was educated and director of a veterinary office, and he knew the ways of the white rulers as well as the Bathurst indigenous upper Aku and Wollof class. In a nutshell Jawara was an unlikely flag bearer of a group whose ways he was apparently uncomfortable with. Indeed, Jawara also wrote that Kabeng Kafoe elders also approached other educated professionals with protectorate heritage for example Dr. Marenah, who turn them down because they were not into politics or could not imagine how to infiltrate the white colonialist as well as contain the Bathurst established political parties? So Jawara’s choices of joining the Christian religion and marrying an Aku lady enabled him the access to the corridors of power, an advantage that would benefit him immensely in leading PPP and the country to independence: In other words, his choice of another way of life parallel to the Mandinka mainstream, ironically helped the protectorate party to gain power directly from the British, which would have gone to the Bathusrt wollofs and Aku’s or (in worst case for the Mandinkas) annexation by Senegal. It would have been catastrophe still entrenched in the hearts and minds of many protectorate folks.
The 1970 Republic and the strains of uniting all
With the April republic, Jawara and the PPP achieved the ultimate power they yearned for. It meant no more Governors general whether British or the last indigenous Farimang Singhateh. PPP now have majority in the parliament, the judiciary and the several Chieftancy constituents. To understand how Jawara undermined the democratic dispensation, we must look at how he tried to consolidate PPP power and image both at home and abroad.
At home and in order to get the Republic, Jawara compromised the PPP by courting the big wigs of the UP party; namely Michael Baldeh, Chief Omar Mbake, Paul L. Baldeh, Momodou Musa Njie, MC Cham, Demba K Cham, and Assan Musa Camara, the powerful political Fula block within the UP. There was reason for the PPP to align or required the support of these UP bigwigs if the Jawara and the PPP was to have any chance of corralling a majority. Consequently, Jawara knew he needed the protectorate Fula politicians from UP to join the PPP for him to win the national majority which enabled him to win and govern. Why Jawara needed to destroy the UP is a mystery other than to curb any political opposition to his rule. His claim that he needed Momodou Musa Njie to ensure that the referendum gets passed was true, because in the protectorate, these individuals are headed the powerful Fula political group. We will see that later in 1975, the infiltration of the PPP by a former UP confidential will create disaffection between Jawara and the by now protectorate elites headed by Sheriff Dibba. I think undertakings of Jawara was not entirely party policy but an undemocratic tendencies by most of the newly independent leaders to grapple absolute power in order to rule as they knew it from the colonial leaders they succeeded. One could argue that they didn’t know better, but again common sense anywhere must or should have guided Jawara’s actions to be aware of their mission and what they are trying achieve for their country.
On the international arena, Jawara embarked on a solo mission. I mean, he tried to portray himself as Gambia itself instead of portraying us like any other newly independent African country at the time. “Our relations with Senegal as an example the rest of West Africa could follow” is misleading. Our relation with Senegal was never easy officially. It’s the informal channels entertained by private peoples along the borders which continues till today that help us co-exist peacefully and intermarry. Jawara’s relation with Senegal was love & hate. Love when it helped him to please either Dakar or the Banjulians and hate when he tries to contain domestic anger prevalent among the Mandinka who were suspicious of the Dakar’s intentions in Senegambia. The Jawara foreign policy was basically an aid dependent policy. Meaning who pays can influence us temporarily while we look for the next benefactor. His claim “foreign assistance was welcome” however “our own efforts ensure the viability of our economy” is baseless chatter far from the realities on the ground in 1970 or say in 1992. I think it would have been better for Jawara to be clear what he wanted and follow that consequently like Nkrumah did. Nkrumah took up the risk to defy the west and implemented one party rule officially and went on to introduce economic policies he thought will reduce the dependence of Ghana from the meddling of the former colonial powers. He was disposed later but at least his countrymen knew the direction he is taking them to. Jawara was dancing in many weddings when he says “more powerful nations were courting our votes in international forums”. Of course he and Gambia profited from such deal makings in forms of grants and bribery for votes in the UN, but with detriment to our fellow African countries like Ghana who at that same time were being penalized by the same “powerful countries” for daring to choose their own way, or the unholy vote against a UNO resolution against Israel. Jawara justifies this step because Israel was assisting us in the agricultural industry, but where those projects and what are the predicaments of the Palestine people today.
Therefore in the light of the steps taken before and after the attainment of the republic status, we say that Jawara instead of “narrowing of the colonial/protectorate gap”, had even widen the divide between the provincials and the Bathurst people. Because he projected a weak sense of direction in the eyes of the protectorate people who brought him to power. His embracing of the UP cronies was disservice to the democracy because a strong and viable UP opposition party would have been necessary to check on the powers of the new republic which rested huge powers on the presidency. Ironically, a word he very often use in his book; his aim of building a “cohesive national picture” actually led to the drifting apart of the formerly protectorate people and the Banjulians, and Jawara himself was now seen as Banjulian. This grave mistake must be squarely place on Jawara and it would be the beginning of the internal struggle between the protectorate alliances versus the Banjulian elites for political dominance. Sheriff Dibba’s troubles will start in 1974 and the creation of NCP in 1975, which eroded Jawara of many credit in mostly Mandinka heartlands. Jawara must have intentionally promoted the rivalries between these two groups in order to strengthen his own grip on power. How can people like MC Cham rose to become influential members of a party they actually opposed 5 years ago? The July 1981 coup was the peak of events that started with the protectorate fallout. Jawara did do realize but like many African rulers, he led himself dictated by events instead of determining events.
The 1981 revolt and the vulnerability of the new republic
Literally, Gambia lost its sovereignty after the 1981 coup. But before I get there, I want to illustrate some crucial points that could have led to the 1981 revolt. These crucial points include the emergence of the “disgruntled youths,” image of Jawara as a betrayer of the protectorate and the effects of an absent leader. That Kukoi and Co. are disgruntled youths as Jawara portrayed them, is true, but these may not be entirely negative as claimed. There was a general disillusionment within the new protectorate literate elites that Jawara concentrated a lot of power and government jobs in the hands of Banjulians. Of course it’s true that most protectorates had fewer skills than those of the colony who benefited from the long running colonial schools. As a leader he is entitled to promote those with the skills to run departments. As Jawara puts it “serious lack of human resources” constrained many of his aims to integrate and as a leader, he is entitled to promote those with the skills to run departments, youth of the protectorate into the work force. I agree with him because at the start of the independence only a dozen protectorate children had a college diploma or university degree. It was very early in 1981 to blame Jawara for the under representation of the protectorate professionals in the work force.
Another crucial point prior to 1981 revolt was the waning support among the Mandinkas. With his marriage to Chilel Njie, many Mandinkas lost any trust in Jawara they might have of promoting Mandinka way of life and traditions. They supported Jawara in all these years primarily because he was their own and all the while hoping that he will change in their favor. But the association with the Njie family and the split with Sheriff Dibba, many protectorate find themselves in the same struggle against the colony as before only that this time it’s not the whites, but one of their own kindred. It’s crucial because the division between the formerly Bathurst and the rest of the country was immense and supported by the British as part of their “divide and rule “policy and the “the indirect rule for the protectorate”. While the colony subdued and assimilated itself with the ways of the colonizers, the protectorate followed their own parallel way of life and resisted successfully against the compromising of their beliefs. So different mentalities developed and to bring those mentalities into a national consciousness remain the big task of our country. Paradoxically, Jawara was the perfect fit to bridge those differences and I think he played well in the first decade of our nationhood. But by 1981, the old tension emerged and because Jawara was absent, often this important national project was neglected. Today a big mistake!
Finally, the absence of Jawara left a vacuum in the political Gambia or dispensation of direction for our country. He was “playing a round of golf at the Hayward’s heath golf club” when the news of the 1981 coup reached him. The president choice of destination for his holiday is a private decision; however the choice of destination is also symbolic. In the whole narration, Jawara never went to Barajally for holidays since his standard 7 and after high school graduation. No other place in Gambia can be prouder to host the former president as guest for only a week. Even apart from the holidays he spent in Haywards, Jawara was incredibly up in the air. He justified those visits with the fact that the “new nation had to be promoted in all the organizations and friendly nations for recognition”. That’s fine, but the assistance they give had not been effectively transformed into tangible results on the ground. Therefore, the question is who oversees those implementations when the president only brings and then leaves again? It’s important to recall that in order to counter the influences of the Banjulians in the power circles of the PPP regime, the protectorate members of the party also grounded the Terri Kafoe in other words “friendship club”. The purpose of this club was essentially to build solidarity lobby among the politicians and professionals of protectorate origin. It was a lobby club and competed with the Banjulian club for funds and influences in the corridors of power. Jawara knew about these developments but was kind of weak to force a truly national interest among his own party affiliates.
These three points led to the 1981 July coup d’état. The events of the coup itself are of no immense important more so the pre and post revolt developments. I say this because Gambia had lost lives in other internal conflicts before and that July event would have been less bloody if the Senegal forces didn’t intervene. I am not saying that they are responsible for the deaths but I am saying the internal conflict in Gambia could have been foreseen and measures taken to address this threatening revolt. The effects of the revolt is far reaching than what Jawara would have liked, namely dependent on foreign forces for security and vulnerability of the administration from both home and abroad.
Without the Senegalese forces Kukoi would have being a president. The Senegalese didn’t come because they liked Jawara but because they know a fragile reinstated Jawara will accept dictates from Dakar than a resurgent and angry Kukoi. That’s why the Senegambia confederation came about and the numerous syndicates and bilateral treaties to cement our so called “new brotherhood”. The security system was disbanded and a new Gendarmarie force was created which were under the control of the Senegal forces. In order to avoid another revolt, selection to the new force was discriminatory towards the provincials especially the Mandinka/Jola aspirants as they were the backbone of Kukoi’s revolt. This new method of selection aggravates the already tension between the rivalries between the Wollofs of the colony and the Mandinkas. From now on the security of the administration would lie in the hands of the Senegalese and the mostly Wollof speaking Gendarmerie. This was a big mistake because in modern nation the army plays a leading role as an institution of national unity.
Commander Mansour Niang informed Jawara that “he received instructions the night before that all Senegalese troops----were to leave immediately” this came at a backdrop of Jawara “discovering that I had no body guards posted” while going to work on Friday 18 August 1989. This event ultimately led to the end of the Senegambia confederacy. I think this episode reveals a lot about the apparent interest of the Senegalese leaders and that of Jawara. So Jawara is left alienated within his own country and a new national Army had to be set up. It’s astonishing to ascertain between the lines that Jawara is afraid of Gambians handling the security affairs of their country all by themselves and thus enlisted again the Nigerians to handle the affairs, nearly 25 years after our independence.
The little trust that existed between Jawara and his people evaporated by 1989, he was just ruling because the alternative Dibba couldn’t fund his campaign effectively against PPP who were using state fund to promote their party. I think Jawara was aware of the threat that will ultimately come with the establishment of the national army with a fair selection process. Whereas in today’s Gambia, President Jammeh relies on the Jola in the army for support and loyal base, Jawara had lost all credit within the Mandinka rank and files. It’s the tragedy that would befall Jawara in 1994, because now the alliance of protectorate offspring’s were ready to die to oust him and Senegal would not repeat a second bloodbath for a so called Senegambia “brotherhood”.
Missed opportunity in Mansa Konko (1992) and the downfall of the elder statesman
There were signs everywhere that Jawara’s time to go was overdue and it must have been for many a sigh of relief when he came to the same conclusion at the 5th PPP National Congress at Mansakonko in 1992. Whether he did it to test the waters was speculative or genuinely is also speculative. But genuinely I believe in the former. Simply because how can somebody in power for 27 years get “taken aback” by understandable fears of some who stand to lose some of their positions when Jawara is no more Presidents? Using “Vox populi Vox Dei” a roman literature to justify staying is a total distortion of political common sense. Senghor of Senegal could have stayed on as well. Ironically Nyima Satou Sanneh Bojang who dared to say that when the president wishes to resign, we “should look among our ranks for replacement” was demonized by the same Jawara clique who claimed to have championed women voice in our country. Actually the factionalism within the PPP raised it head again because actually the protectorate block of the party see in Bakary Darboe as the potential successor. A possibility the Banjulian faction and Jawara inner family was not happy with.
Leadership vacuum is the best description of the PPP between 1980 and 1992. The country had no direction and feeling that no one is at the top easily became the attitude of all people from top to bottom. Jawara even started to observer that “even with honest people at the top, things can go wrong”, a statement that would cost a leader of a western country his job. It’s a sign of resignation and it should have been Jawara’s self honesty to step down and through that stimulates a new life at the top echelons of our state leadership. President Roosevelt said that “fear the fear itself”, which literally means that our fear is our worst enemy because it paralyses us. Instead of Jawara recognizing the sign of his fading acceptance among the populace, he feared what will become of him when he relinquishes power.
Decisions regarding once political future in the absent of a term limit must be connected to a performance measurement and consequential political principles. I mean with performance determined leadership that when the task set out is not achieved in two terms, then by the middle of the third term a president must organize a succession planning so that successor within his own party will succeed him and call new elections. Jawara missed to learn from his good friends namely the British who have perfected this type of leadership change in the absent of a written constitution. Or did he thought we are very stupid than the British public? This is a grave mistake to underrate us because actually the uneducated protectorate peoples were the founders of the PPP and ultimately held the destiny of the party and Jawara’s leadership. The same “voice of the people is voice of god” translated from Latin to English can be used to describe the collective passiveness that greeted Jawara downfall in 1994. The same minority elders and traditional leaders thronged to the state house to bless the new rulers and for continuous peace in the Gambia.
Finally I would advice all to read this interesting and worthwhile book from a man who steered our Gambia for 30 years. Jawara want this book to shed a positive light on his leadership which I think he deserves accordingly. We enjoyed peace since independence and in terms of education, health, communication and international recognition and respect we made great strides under Jawara leadership. There was civility in the dispensation of the rule of law and attitude to opponents was far civil than we are experiencing now. Nevertheless we could still blame Jawara for bringing us into the hands of the soldiers and the avoidable situation we are in now. Had he tamed his ego and understood that better quit while the sun shines, then he would have saved himself all the disgrace he went through. Perhaps God wants it this way, for the downfall of Jawara is a result of the protracted conflicts between Jawara and his own Mandinka heritage. He wanted to change them, he felt not supported by them since childhood, he collaborated with them to win power, he lost their re-won affection but missed the opportunity to say bye in decorum. I hope we all learn from our respective mistakes. But Jawara was not only a victim of Mandinka mentality.
Disclaimer:Views expressed in this narrative do not represent Senegambia News’s understanding and knowledge of the political history under review. All views expressed are, therefore, solely the author’s perspectives.
Source: Senegambianews
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A clear conscience fears no accusation - proverb from Sierra Leone |
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Senegambia
175 Posts |
Posted - 03 Oct 2010 : 19:34:17
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I recommend everyone out there to get a copy of Jawara's book if you want to get the whole picture straight from the horse's mouth. These subjective reviews out there make me wonder if it is the same book that I read. I think Jawara was candid in his book and, to my appreciation, wrote in such a form that the book cannot in anyway serve to be divisive under any political climate in the country, now or in the future. The book was informative, less tribalistic in content, non discriminatory against any group what so ever. Even me would do some things differently had I been in Jawara's shoes, and so will each and everyone of you. The most important thing is that he took responsibility and tried to defend some of his policies, internal and external.
I needed to know who the man Jawara really was; I bought Kairaba. If nothing, it gave me a better picture of who he really was as a head of state. There is more to be learned, yes, and I hope one day influential leaders in Senegambia who witnessed the rise and fall of the confederation will come out with their sides of the story.
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Tesito
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Moe
USA
2326 Posts |
Posted - 03 Oct 2010 : 23:50:07
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| Senegambia, Unless you know nothing about your brothers and their sycophancy, They will all try to give you an analysis of something they barely understand , underscoring the whole impression of the overall book is their ultimate objective to highlight themselves, Modern African Educated illiterates is what I call them.....................peace |
I am Jebel Musa better yet rock of Gibraltar,either or,still a stronghold and a Pillar commanding direction
The GPU wants Me Hunted Down for what I don't know ..... |
Edited by - Moe on 03 Oct 2010 23:50:47 |
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Senegambia
175 Posts |
Posted - 04 Oct 2010 : 00:01:12
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You are not the one I team up with everyday but I will have to say, Moe, that you are absolutely right.
quote:
Originally posted by Moe
Senegambia, Unless you know nothing about your brothers and their sycophancy, They will all try to give you an analysis of something they barely understand , underscoring the whole impression of the overall book is their ultimate objective to highlight themselves, Modern African Educated illiterates is what I call them.....................peace
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Tesito
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Momodou
Denmark
11717 Posts |
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Janyanfara
Tanzania
1350 Posts |
Posted - 21 Jun 2011 : 01:26:10
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quote:
Originally posted by Moe
Senegambia, Unless you know nothing about your brothers and their sycophancy, They will all try to give you an analysis of something they barely understand , underscoring the whole impression of the overall book is their ultimate objective to highlight themselves, Modern African Educated illiterates is what I call them.....................peace
Moe where did you borrow that intelligence from? I mean I have never agreed with any thing moe but the above is a master statement. Some guys do have some issues to do with anything nko. but honestly speaking the do have real real probs because unless we give each other due each deserves , ..........continues unabated
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